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PRIVACY RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
Jonathan L. Entrn*
THE RIGHT OF privacy has become a staple of public dis-

course. Most commonly, this subject serves as a euphemism for
abortion,' as the debate over the Supreme Court nominations of
Judges Bork and Souter demonstrated. But privacy implicates
more than what we do in our bedrooms. Under modern fourth
amendment doctrine, for example, a "reasonable expectation of
privacy" triggers the requirement that the authorities obtain a
search warrant. The census, in which we are all legally obliged to
participate, assures us of the privacy of our responses, although
those statutory assurances apparently have failed to persuade
many persons to cooperate with the decennial enumeration of the
population.a As Professor Flaherty shows elsewhere in this symposium, various federal statutes allow individuals to verify the accuracy of personal information contained in official and unofficial
data bases.
On the centennial of the publication of the Warren and Brandeis article, 5 then, we should note how much our conceptions of
privacy have changed. Many of the changes in our thinking con-

*

Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.
1. The qualified constitutional right to obtain an abortion is based upon the pregnant
woman's right to privacy. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973). This privacy rationale was an extension of the reasoning that had condemned state laws prohibiting access to
contraceptives. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
2. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
3. The legal obligation to participate in the census is specified in 13 U.S.C. §§ 221225 (1988). Concern over the accuracy and inclusiveness of the census has spawned an
increasingly large body of litigation in recent years. See, e.g., City of New York v. United
States Dep't of Commerce, 739 F Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y 1990) (collecting cases); M. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN CENSUS 131-235 (1988); Conk, The 1980 Census in Historical
Perspective, in THE POLTICS OF NUMBERS 155 (W Alonso & P Starr eds. 1987). This
concern is not exclusively a modern phenomenon, however. See, e.g., P COHEN. A CALCULATING PEOPLE 175-204 (1982) (discussing the controversy over the 1840 census).
4. See Flaherty, On the Utility of ConstitutionalRights to Privacy and Data Protection, 41 CASE W RES. L. REV. 831 (1991).
5. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:689

cern the scope of the right. Various commentators have debated
the nature of the interests protected by Warren and Brandeis's
right to privacy and have questioned the substantiality of the injuries that are assumed to have given rise to the article and to many
invasion of privacy claims.' These are important and controversial
issues, but they are not the only ones worth considering. While we
debate the nature of the right, we may overlook the complexities
of the remedy. Perhaps, though, thinking about the remedy might
help us to understand the nature of the right.

I
Professor Post has given us a characteristically elegant analysis of the sociology of privacy law. Those who value only scholarship which provides an algorithm that generates predictable results in every plausible hypothetical lawsuit will find his paper
disappointing. For reasons discussed below, however, this frank
recognition of the difficulty of fashioning a reasonably straightforward legal rule is one of the paper's great virtues.
The elegance of Professor Post's analysis consists in his transcending a purely individualistic notion of privacy in favor of a
more complex conception that emphasizes the interdependence of
individuals and their communities. Here, as elsewhere,7 Professor
Post synthesizes the work of such leading social theorists as Simmel, Mead, Parsons, Goffman, and Gouldner with traditional legal
doctrine and commentary. Indeed, one of Professor Post's aims
seems to be to break through the traditional intellectual antagonism between the law, viewed as an autonomous discipline, and
the social sciences.' Under this approach, the insights of social

6. See, e.g., Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326 (1966); Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291 (1983).
7. Of most immediate relevance to this symposium, see Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957
(1989); Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 691 (1986); Post, The ConstitutionalConcept of Public Discourse:
Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103
HARV. L. REV. 603 (1990).
8. On the increasing impact of intellectual perspectives from outside the law as traditionally defined, see Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987,
100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 766-77 (1987). Judge Posner's prolific scholarship has contributed
to the rise of the law and economics movement. See, e.g., R. POSNER. EcONOMIc ANALYSIS
OF LAW (3d ed. 1986). Interdisciplinary work by legal scholars is by no means new. An
important strand of legal realism rested upon empirical studies drawing upon the research
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theory enrich our understanding of the normative dimensions of
privacy but preserve the primacy of lawyers and legal institutions
in the resolution of legal questions in this field.9
Given this analytical framework, much of the difficulty in defining the precise contours of the right to privacy arises from the
obvious pluralism of our society. The legal system emphasizes dichotomous thinking: winners and losers, rights and wrongs. Even
in a time of four-part tests or reasonable persons, the law aims to
simplify norms and customs so that legal institutions can define
and apply legal rules in understandable and relatively consistent

fashion. 10 The debate over privacy arises precisely because of our
cultural heterogeneity, as Professor Zimmerman has suggested."
Some of the uneasiness over recognition of Warren and Brandeis's right to privacy stems from concerns about remedies. Attempting to define privacy rights in terms of the possible means
for their vindication should not strike anyone as novel. The scope
of other substantive legal rights is affected by remedial concerns.
The law of nuisance is a notable example.' 2 Some jurisdictions
have allowed plaintiffs injunctive relief whenever a nuisance
causes "not unsubstantial" damages. 3 Yet in two prominent nuitraditions of sociology and psychology. See L. KALMAN. LEGAL REALISM AT YALE. 19271960, at 3-44 (1986); W. LOH, SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 610-14, 662-

76 (1984). Despite the demise of the realist movement, however, the empirical tradition
survives in the law and society field.
9. There is a different school of social science, one that is more explicitly quantitative in its orientation. That school of social research is represented by another commentator
on Professor Post's paper, Dean Bezanson, who coauthored a monumental empirical study
of libel litigation, R. BEZANSON. G. CRANBERG & J. SOLOSKi. LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS:
MYTH AND REALITY (1987). This is not the occasion to compare these research traditions.
It is sufficient to note that both the more qualitative analyses exemplified in the works upon
which Professor Post relies and the more quantitative work of the kind Dean Bezanson has
done reveal the ambiguity, inconsistency, and contextuality in our understanding of the
world.
10. See Bohannon, The Differing Realms of the Law, 67 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 33,
37 (1965).
!1. See Zimmerman, supra note 6, at 334-36.
12. Other instances include freedom of speech, see, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 149 (1983); procedural due process, see, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50
(1976); and civil rights, see, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377-79 (1976). See
Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 674-76 (1983) (collecting cases
from additional areas).
13. Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 4-5, 101 N.E. 805, 806 (1913).
The injunction allowed under this rule must be tailored to the circumstances. See, e.g.,
McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 189 N.Y. 40, 50-51, 81 N.E. 549, 552 (1907)
(modifying injunction to permit defendant to change rather than cease its operations if it
could O1oso without causing further harm to plaintiff).
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sance cases courts have crafted novel remedies out of concern for
the drastic efforts of injunctions. The first awarded permanent
damages in lieu of an injunction where the injunction would have
shut down a large company that employed over 300 people.14 The
second required the plaintiff, which had come to the nuisance, to
indemnify the defendant for its relocation expenses where both
parties were engaged in socially desirable but mutually incompatible activities."5 Questions about remedies are also raised, but not
answered, in connection with the appropriation tort that Professor
Post discusses in his paper. It is to this subject that I now turn.
II
Warren and Brandeis expected damages to be the main remedy for invasion of privacy. As Professor Post notes in his discussion of appropriation, the philosophical basis for the tort affects
the type of damages available to a plaintiff. If appropriation is
viewed in property terms, damages will be commodified or measured by the market. If appropriation is viewed in personality
terms, however, damages for mental or emotional distress will be
available. 6 More generally, damages for privacy claims based
upon intrusion, public disclosure, and false light also may include
recovery for mental and emotional distress.
It is precisely because plaintiffs can recover for psychic injury
that some critics are uncomfortable with the privacy tort. As Professor Post points out, the common law was generally hostile to
such claims both at the time that Warren and Brandeis wrote and
for years afterward. Psychic injuries were viewed as idiosyncratic,
intangible, and ephemeral. Underlying the skepticism about the
privacy tort is a sense that juries will make extravagant awards to
respectable plaintiffs who have suffered no real harm simply to
punish unpopular or disfavored defendants. We need not look far
for examples of this phenomenon in related areas of tort law. Consider the award of $200,000 in damages to Jerry Falwell by a
hometown jury on the basis of a modest showing of distress over

14. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 225-28, 257 N.E.2d 870, 87375, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 316-19 (1970).
15. Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 184-86, 494 P.2d
700, 706-08 (1972).
16. See Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appropriation, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 647, 670-74 (1991).
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an offensive parody in Hustler Magazine,17 or the award of
$500,000 in damages to L.B. Sullivan by another hometown jury
on the basis of factual errors in an advertisement that did not even
remotely refer to him. 8
Perhaps we should not despair over the work of juries. After
all, a jury in Ohio recently refused to convict anyone involved in
the display of provocative photographs by Robert Mapplethorpe,
and a jury in Florida rejected criminal charges against the controversial musical group 2 Live Crew. I am uncomfortable with argument by anecdote, though, and the Falwell and New York Times
juries suggest that the fear of unprincipled verdicts is not entirely

unwarranted.
Although the Supreme Court overturned these awards on

first amendment grounds, the Court has defined compensable actual damages in libel litigation to include "personal humiliation
and mental anguish and suffering." 119 Perhaps the answer is to
adopt for privacy claims constitutional constraints analogous to
those that apply to defamation, although the libel regime's em-

phasis on varying levels of fault for various permutations of parties and issues has left almost everyone dissatisfied.
The complexity of the libel regime has led to numerous reform proposals. Among these are nondamage schemes such as retraction, 20 repair, 21 and judicial determination of truth or falsity. 22
But these alternatives would not work very effectively for intrusion
or public disclosure claims because they would entail further dis-

17. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 47-48 (1988); see Entin, Privacy, Emotional Distress, and the Limits of Libel Law Reform, 38 MERCER L. REv. 835,
853-54 (1987).
18. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see Kalven, The New
York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup.
CT. REv. 191, 194-200.
19. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
20. See, e.g., R. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS 241-42 (1986). The constitutionality of a
compelled retraction or right to reply is unclear. Compare Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating state law conferring mandatory right of reply
upon political candidates who are attacked by newspapers), with Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding administrative regulation providing right of
reply to persons attacked in broadcasts concerning matters of public importance).
21. See LeBel, Reforming the Tort of Defamation: An Accommodation of the Competing Interests Within the Current Constitutional Framework, 66 NEB. L. REv. 249, 30516 (1987).
22. See, e.g., R. BEZANSON, G. CRANBERG & J. SOLOSKI, supra note 9, at 209-19;
Leval, The No-Money, No-Fault Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan in its Proper Place, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1287 (1988).
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semination of the truthful private information that already had
been improperly disclosed.
Other suggested changes have addressed the nature of permissible awards. One possibility would be to prohibit, or at least
restrict, the availability of punitive damages on the theory that
they are "private fines levied by civil juries."23 Alternatively, a
cap could be imposed on damages for invasion of
privacy, or dam24
ages might be limited to actual pecuniary loss.
The attack on damage awards for mental and emotional distress in privacy cases raises broader questions that relate to complaints about a more general liability crisis in the contemporary
tort system. Some of those complaints include examples of allegh merits
eisoof
edly frivolous claims of psychic injury. 25 Whatever the
those complaints and however excessively pro-plaintiff tort doctrine has become, the common law has been awarding damages
for dignitary and intangible harms for a long time. Perhaps Warren and Brandeis proceeded from a mugwump and even hypersensitive conception of the civility rules that ought to govern a heterogeneous society.26 Maybe they drew the line in the wrong place.
But are those of us who view their outrage over the seemingly
trivial transgressions of the Boston press a century ago as excessive really prepared to deny that victims of racial, religious, or
sexual harassment suffer genuine mental and emotional distress,
or to say that such genuine distress should always go
uncompensated?
If we are uncomfortable with damage remedies, at least for
nonpecuniary injuries, we might consider some form of injunctive
relief. A notable recent example is General Noriega's attempt to
enjoin CNN from broadcasting the government's tape recordings
of his privileged telephone conversations with his lawyers.
There are at least two problems with injunctive relief in pri-

23. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
24. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
771-72 (1985) (White, J., concurring); Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof,
25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 747, 756-73 (1984); Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to "'The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 603, 615 (1983).
25. See, e.g., P. HUBER, LIABILITY 121-27 (1988).
26. See Post, supra note 16, at 652.
27. United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Cable News Network v. Noriega, Ill S. Ct. 451 (1990). The preliminary injunction was
later terminated by the district court. See United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1045
(S.D. Fla. 1990).
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vacy cases. First, the victim frequently will not learn about 'a privacy invasion before the defendant disseminates the information.
An injunction cannot be effective in these circumstances. Second,
an injunction against publication is a prior restraint, and prior restraints carry an enormous presumption of invalidity under the
first amendment. The reasoning of Nebraska Press Association v.
Stuart28 suggests that Noriega's injunction request cannot over-

come that presumption. 29 After all, the harm to General Noriega
was caused by the government's misconduct in recording his privileged communications; CNN's actions cannot undo that injury,
which might well require that all charges be dropped.

Perhaps this situation is more complex. After all, two lower
courts upheld the interim injunction. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has never endorsed a per se rule against prior restraints

(and has upheld some arrangements that look remarkably like
prior restraints). 30 Alternatively, perhaps these tapes compromise

the attorney-client privilege, a relationship between particular individuals that protects the covered information from dissemination

forever. This would distinguish the Noriega situation from Nebraska Press, where the information at issue would have eventu-

ally become public.
If some variant of this argument ultimately prevails, 31 certain
privacy claimants might find it possible to obtain injunctive relief.
But the cost of such relief might prove substantial. The prior restraint doctrine is hedged about with exceptions and inconsisten-

cies, focusing exclusively upon the timing of speech regulation and
embodying no substantive vision of the first amendment.3 2 Never-

28. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
29. Id. at 559.
30. On the rejection of a per se rule against prior restraints, see, e.g., Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 47 (1961); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
The Supreme Court has upheld licensing schemes against first amendment challenges, at
least where those schemes provide appropriate procedural safeguards to assure prompt, unbiased decisions. See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941); cf. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1968) (suggesting procedural protections that would
allow licensing schemes to survive constitutional challenge). Injunctions against publication
are regularly issued to prevent copyright infringment. See, e.g., In re Capital Cities/ABC,
Inc., 918 F.2d 140, 144 (11th Cir. 1990); Post, supra note 16, at 664 n.90.
31. The district court in Noriega concluded that there was no factual basis for an
injunction in that case. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1045, 1053-54 (S.D. Fla.
1990). This ruling does not preclude the possibility of entering an injunction in other
circumstances.
32. See, e.g., Jeffries, Rethinking PriorRestraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 419-34 (1983);
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theless, relaxing the presumption against prior restraints could
have profound symbolic effects. Whatever the defects and limitations of the doctrine, everyone agrees that the first amendment
was intended, at least, to discourage prior restraints.83 Overturning this settled assumption might raise doubts about the vitality of
many modern first amendment principles that remain
controversial.
Finally, let us return to Professor Post's provocative suggestion that privacy doctrine reflects and seeks to enforce civility
rules. If he is correct, an unlawful invasion of privacy injures not
only the victim but also the community as a whole. Recall the
Supreme Court's characterization of punitive damages as "private
' This statement implies that
fines levied by civil juries."34
the community has some role to play in enforcing its rules and punishing
those who violate them. Perhaps we should treat at least some invasions of privacy as crimes. Indeed, some invasions of privacy,
most notably intrusions, often are crimes.35 Treating privacy violations as crimes would not necessarily preclude victims from maintaining tort actions, as we all learned in our first year of law
school. But if privacy concerns not just atomistic individuals but
persons embedded in a social environment, perhaps those who violate privacy norms should be made to compensate not just the individual victim but the collectivity within which the victim is
embedded.
Imposing criminal sanctions for privacy invasions poses
daunting problems, however. For example, expanding the categories of expression that could give rise to prosecution might have an
unacceptably large chilling effect on constitutionally valued
speech. Drafting a penal statute of sufficient precision to avoid
running afoul of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines will not
be easy, either.
In sum, even if we agreed fully with Warren and Brandeis
about the need to afford legal protection for privacy, serious remedial problems would remain. This brief discussion is intended to
stimulate further thought about those problems. Perhaps the diffibut see Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L.
REV. 11 (1981).
33. See, e.g., Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
34. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
35. For example, a prominent AIDS researcher recently reported that intruders had
broken into his home, apparently in search, of scientific data. Culliton, Gallo Reports Mystery Break-in, 250 Sci. 502 (1990).
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culty of crafting acceptable remedies will persuade us that Warren and Brandeis were pursuing a legal chimera. Alternatively,
thinking about remedial issues might help us more clearly to define the substantive right that we call privacy
III
Like Professor Post, I have raised more questions than I have
answered. In doing so, I take my cue from Professor Schauer, who
has expressed the hope that we would come here to inquire and
discuss rather than to debate or promote simple solutions to complex problems. I hope that some of my questions will stimulate
responses, even if those responses show me how much more I need
to know

